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Allocating RI/FS Expenses Between
Defense and Indemnity Provisions of
Old Insurance Policies
Alan B. Schafert
We must avoid, at all costs, another war of experts to
determine how much of the costs should be allocated to
defense and how much to indemnity.
-Supreme Court of New Jersey'
Cleaning up pollution is expensive. Deciding who should pay
for cleaning up pollution under the Comprehensive Environmen-
tal Response, Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA")2 is
also expensive.' Too expensive. One of the latest episodes of
CERCLA litigation centers on whether insurers or their policy-
holders should pay the unforeseen costs of investigating polluted
sites.
Under CERCLA, a party that has been targeted as possibly
liable for a polluted site, a "Potentially Responsible Party"
("PRP"), must pay the costs of the remedial investiga-
tion/feasibility study ("RITFS"). Because liability under CERCLA
is both strict and retroactive,' the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") holds polluting companies responsible for con-
tamination that may have begun twenty or thirty years ago,
when it may have been legal. Because of the resulting large and
unanticipated investigation and cleanup costs, PRPs with Com-
prehensive General Liability ("CGL") insurance and their insur-
ers now face off against each other in expensive legal battles over
RI/FS expenses should, be covered.
Because of the open-ended nature of the CGL policies in
effect at the time of the pollution, PRPs and their insurers dis-
t B.A. 1990, University of Chicago; J.D. Candidate 1998, University of Chicago.
General Accident Insurance Co. v Department of Environmental Protection, 672 A2d
1154, 1162 (NJ 1996).
2 42 USC § 9601 et seq (1994).
' See Domtar, Inc. v Niagara Fire Insurance Co., 552 NW2d 738, 743 (Minn App
1996) (cost of defense was $1.154 million).
See, for example, United States v Monsanto Co., 858 F2d 160, 173-74 (4th Cir
1988).
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agree over whether RI/FS expenses should be classified as a cost
of defending the PRP, which would increase an insurer's liability,
or as a cost of cleaning up the pollution, which would increase
the PRP's liability. While courts might resolve this issue by sim-
ply deciding to classify RI/FS expenses one way or the other, such
a simplistic solution would not address the complexity of the
underlying equitable considerations. Due to the dual nature of
RI/FS expenses, which arguably are necessary for both defense
and cleanup purposes, courts have not yet arrived at a simple
and fair method of addressing this issue. In 1996 alone, various
courts have said that "the applicable caselaw... is jumbled,"5
that courts have not yet arrived at "any clear consensus, and
that no case "provides a comprehensive principle of decision. "'
Because PRPs and their insurers do not have the certainty of
a simple and fair method of allocating RI/FS expenses, they tend
to be unwilling to settle. Instead, the two sides bring their dis-
pute into the courtroom, which wastes time and resources that
the parties could better devote to cleaning up the pollution.' The
certainty of a simple and fair method of allocating RI/FS expens-
es would allow insurers and policyholders to anticipate a judicial
outcome, to settle their differences, and to focus their efforts on
cleaning up the pollution at hand.
This legal uncertainty and waste of resources is unnecessary.
By combining the best parts of two existing legal tests, courts
could have a simple and fair legal rule.
Part I of this Comment will describe the context surrounding
RI/FS expenses. Part II will present the jumbled state of the
current law and argue that within a general trend toward a mid-
dle ground, three principal approaches have emerged. In Part III,
the Comment will first describe the characteristics of an ideal
test while describing the shortcomings of each of the three exist-
ing approaches. It will then show that a combination of two of
the tests would best serve the fairness and simplicity goals of an
ideal test. Finally, the Comment will discuss potential implemen-
tation issues and conclude that a combination test would save
resources that are being wasted today.
' Endicott Johnson Corp. v Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 928 F Supp 176, 183 (N D
NY 1996), appeal dismissed, 116 F3d 53 (2d Cir 1997).
Domtar, 552 NW2d at 751.
General Accident, 672 A2d at 1160.
See, for example, Jerry L. Anderson, The Hazardous Waste Land, 13 Va Envir L J
1, 4 (1993).
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I. IN THE CONTEXT OF CGL INSURANCE, RI/FS EXPENSE
CATEGORIES OVERLAP
Taken together, remedial investigations and feasibility stud-
ies constitute one of the first legally mandated steps in the regu-
lated process of cleaning up a polluted site under CERCLA. That
process begins when the EPA or its state equivalent decides to
take action on a polluted site. The EPA decides which party or
parties it believes may have caused the pollution and notifies
them of their designation as a PRP under CERCLA.9 Under
CERCLA, the next step is to conduct an RI to determine the
extent of the problem and who is liable, and an FS to determine
which cleanup strategy to use.1"
Although the PRP has the option to remain inactive, forcing
the EPA to conduct the RI/FS on its own and then bill the PRP
for the full cost, the PRP will generally save money if it gets the
EPA's permission to take the lead in carrying out the RI/FS."
PRPs can "maximize" their cost savings by leading the studies
that, among other things, put them "in a better position to influ-
ence the choice of the remedy."2
Remedial investigations and feasibility studies serve distinct
purposes. Remedial investigations assess pollution and liabili-
ty. 3 The PRP investigates the polluted site, often by hiring spe-
cialized engineering firms, to determine: (1) the full extent of the
pollution, (2) the extent to which it is responsible, and (3) the
extent to which any other potential polluters are responsible.'
Concurrently, or subsequently, the PRP conducts feasibility stud-
ies to "evaluate alternatives to the extent necessary to select a
remedy."" Because the cost of remedial alternatives can range
' Whether this notification, called a PRP letter, triggers coverage under CGL policies
varies from state to state. For example, in Michigan, a PRP letter triggers CGL coverage,
while in Illinois, it does not. Michigan Millers Mutual Insurance Co. v Bronson Plating
Co., 519 NW2d 864 (Mich 1994); Forest Preserve District of DuPage County v Pacific
Indemnity Co., 665 NE2d 305 (IlM 1996).
10 42 USC § 9604(a1).
Aerojet-General Corp. v Transport Indemnity Co., 53 Cal Rptr 2d 398, 408 (Cal App
1996). See also Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. Inc. v Pintlar Corp., 948 F2d 1507, 1517 (9th
Cir 1991) ("In many instances, it is more prudent for the PRP to undertake the environ-
mental studies and cleanup measures itself than to await the EEA's subsequent suit in a
cost recovery action.").
12 Bernard J. Reilly, Minimizing Your Company's Superfund Liabilities, 317 PLI/Real
Estate 333, 335-36 (1988).
13 40 CFR § 300.430 (1994).
" Telephone interview with Val Britton, Engineer, Science Management Consult-
ing-Environmental Services Group, GeoSciences Division, (Jan 8, 1997).
5 40 CFR § 300.430(aX2).
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from expensive to exorbitant, the PRP uses feasibility studies to
find the most cost-effective cleanup alternative.
Under a long-standing interpretation of CGL policies, insur-
ers have a duty to pay the insured PRP's damages and to defend
the PRP against any charges for damages.' Although the duty
to defend and the duty to indemnify arise out of the same insur-
ance policy, they are distinct in several ways. The duty to defend
is broader than the duty to pay damages. 17 An insurer has a
duty to defend if the allegations "arguably""' come within policy
coverage, even if the allegations may be "groundless or frivo-
lous." ' As noted in Aerojet-General Corp. v Transport Indemnity
Co., if the claim seems rationally related to the areas covered by
the CGL policy, the insurer has a duty to defend, even if the
court later finds that the claim falls outside the policy cover-
age.' Thus, the insurer may not be ultimately liable for the
cleanup but may still have a duty to defend the PRP.2' The duty
to indemnify, on the other hand, is the narrower duty of paying
meritorious claims.'
The most important difference between the duty to indemni-
fy and the duty to defend is that often one is capped by the policy
limit while the other is not. Most CGL policies in place at the
time pollution occurred contained defined limits on what the
insurer would pay for damages, but did not contain a correspond-
ing cap on the cost of defense.' Thus, because the extraordinari-
ly high cost of cleaning up pollution often reach the indemnity
limits of the PRP's insurance, both parties care very much
whether courts treat what can be substantial RI/FS expenses'
as cleanup damages or as defense costs. PRPs want RIFS ex-
penses to be covered as defense costs, while insurers want RI/FS
expenses to be included in the policy cap as damages.
1" See Donald E. Sharpe & Jean K Shaffer, The Parameters of an Insurer's Duty to
Defend, 19 Forum 555 (1984).
" American Bumper & Manufacturing Co. v Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 550 NW2d
475, 481 (Mich 1996).
18 Id.
19 Id.
' 53 Cal Rptr 2d 39S, 407 (Cal App 1996).
21 Id.
' Millpore Corp. v Travelers Indemnity Co., 115 F3d 21, 35 (1st Cir 1997); La Farge
Corp. v Travelers Indemnity Co., 118 F3d 1511, 1516 (11th Cir 1997).
Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v California, 509 US 764, 771 (1993) ("CGL insurance
has traditionally provided that the insurer would bear the legal costs of covered claims
against the insured without regard to the policy's stated limits of coverage .... ").
See, for example, Domtar, 552 NW2d at 743 (cost of defense was $1.154 million,
while damages were $1.664 million).
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The dual nature of RI/FS expenses stems from the fact that
investigation is necessary both to prepare an adequate defense
and to clean up the site. Preparing an adequate defense is a
defense cost, while cleaning up the site is covered under the
indemnity provisions. For example, if an investigation showed
either that the pollution did not exist, or that the PRP could not
have been responsible, one could easily consider the investigation
expenses as part of the cost of defense. On the other hand, if a
PRP immediately admitted complete liability and began working
with the EPA to clean up the site, much of the very same investi-
gation would be a necessary first step in the cleanup process,
which would be covered as damages.
Because of the dual nature of RI/FS expenses and the oppos-
ing financial interests of the parties, insurers and PRPs take
opposing positions. Insurers often argue that all RI/FS expenses
should be classified as indemnity costs. They contend that an
RI/FS is not only an essential first step in cleaning up the pollut-
ed site, but is also a mandated result of the EPA's CERCLA
action, making it akin to damages. On the other hand, PRPs
argue that all RI/FS expenses should be classified as defense
costs. They insist that all RI/FS expenses are for defense because
they are necessary to limit liability or to reduce the amount of
damages. Courts face the task of developing a legal test that will
resolve the conundrum fairly and allow future parties to settle
the matter with minimal legal expense.
II. REVIEWING CURRENT CASELAW: THREE APPROACHES
Even though insurers may continue to maintain that all
RIIFS expenses are solely indemnity costs, and PRPs may forever
claim that RIIFS expenses are solely defense costs, the emerging
trend is toward a middle ground. Courts initially tended to re-
solve the allocation issue entirely in favor of one side or the oth-
er. More recently, however, courts have reconsidered their own
rulings or have overruled lower courts because they believe that
the dual nature of RI/FS expenses makes a one-sided conclusion
contrary to the "[p]rinciples of simple justice."25
In 1995, a New Jersey appellate court issued a declaratory
judgment that RI/FS expenses were entirely defense costs.2' In
2 General Accident Insurance Co. v Department of Environmental Protection, 672 A2d
1154, 1163 (NJ 1996) (overturning a lower court ruling that all RIFS expenses were de-
fense costs).
26 General Accident Insurance Co. v Department of Environmental Protection, 651 A2d
551]
556 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1997:
1996, however, the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed, ruling
that the lower court should have arrived at a "fair" allocation
based on multiple factors, not just a legal ruling for one side or
the other. 7
In 1994, the Northern District of California ruled that all of
the PRP's RI/FS expenses were defense costs.' In 1995, the
court reconsidered its decision, stated that it had "clearly erred,"
and asked the parties for the evidence needed to allocate costs
between defense and indemnity.'
In 1996, the California Court of Appeals issued a declaratory
judgment reversing the trial court's jury instruction that classi-
fied RI/FS expenses as primarily indemnity costs."0 The court
cited the "dual utility" of site investigations and ruled that RI[FS
expenses should qualify more easily as defense costs.31 Thus, the
trend in the case law is to move away from an "either/or" answer
to the RI/FS question of classification and toward a middle
ground.
Despite the trend toward a middle ground, courts still de-
scribe the caselaw as "jumbled"32 and lacking any "clear consen-
sus."' States have generally adopted three approaches to the
RI/FS question of classification: (1) The "Michigan test" (Michi-
gan, California, and Minnesota), (2) The "New Jersey test" (New
Jersey), and (3) The "New York test" (New York).
A. The Michigan Test
The "Michigan test"' defines defense costs broadly, in prac-
tice allocating most RI/FS expense liability to the insurer. This
approach presumes RI/FS expenses mandated by CERCLA are
472, 475 (NJ Super 1995), rev'd, 672 A2d 1154 (NJ 1996).
' General Accident Insurance Co. v Department of Environmental Protection, 672 A2d
1154, 1162 (NJ 1996).
County of Santa Clara v United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co., 868 F Supp 274, 280 (N D Cal 1994), vacated, 1995 WL 638568 (N D Cal).
County of Santa Clard v United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 1995 WL 638568,
*4 (N D Cal).
' Aerojet-General Corp. v Transport Indemnity Co., 53 Cal Rptr 2d 398, 409 (Cal App
1996).
Id at 410.
32 Endicott Johnson Corp. v Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 928 F Supp 176, 183 (N D
NY 1996).
Domtar, Inc. v Niagara Fire Insurance Co., 562 NW2d 738, 751 (Minn App 1996).
See, for example, Fireman's Fund Insurance Cos. v Ex-Cell-O Corp., 790 F Supp
1318 (E D Mich 1992); American Bumper & Manufacturing Co. v Hartford Fire Insurance
Co., 550 NW2d 475, 481 (Mich 1996); Aerojet, 53 Cal Rptr 2d at 412.
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indemnity costs. 5 However, PRPs may rebut this presumption
by showing that the RI/FS expenses in question were part of a
reasonable and necessary defense either to defeat or limit the
scope of liability or to limit the cost of remediation for the
PRP." The PRP cannot rebut the presumption if the RI/FS ex-
penses either would have been, spent eventually as a normal cost
of business even without the EPA action 7 or would not have
been undertaken voluntarily as reasonable and necessary to
prepare a defense if there had been no governmental request or
order.' Under the Michigan test, defense costs include RI/FS
expenses incurred to limit the cost of remediation.9 In limiting
the cost of remediation to the PRP, the Michigan test does not
consider the policy limits on the CGL insurance, requiring only
that the defense costs be "reasonable and necessary.' ° Typical-
ly, feasibility studies seek to find the least expensive remediation
alternative.41 Therefore, under the Michigan test, remediation
study expenses are usually considered defense costs as long as
they are part of a "reasonable and necessary" defense."2
The Michigan test excludes feasibility studies from defense
costs only if such studies involve the actual implementation of
the cleanup. For example, because studies carried out to effectu-
ate a chosen cleanup alternative or to monitor the continuing
spread of contamination address implementation issues, they fall
outside the realm of limiting liability or damages.' If a PRP
was likely to incur an RI/FS expense even without a CERCLA
action, courts categorize the expense as an indemnity cost. In
American Bumper, for example, the court categorized the investi-
gation costs that the PRP would have spent to renew one of its
permits in the absence of a CERCLA claim as indemnity costs."
B. The New Jersey Test
As articulated by the New Jersey Supreme Court in General
Accident Insurance Co. v Department of Environmental Protec-
35 Ex-Cell-O, 790 F Supp at 1338.
Id.
3' American Bumper, 550 NW2d at 486.
3 Aerojet, 53 Cal Rptr 2d at 412.
3' American Bumper, 550 NW2d at 485-86.
'0 Id at 485.
41 40 CFR § 300.430 (1994).
4 American Bumper, 550 NW2d at 485.
County of Santa Clara, 1995 WL 638568 at *4 n 1.
" American Bumper, 550 NW2d at 486.
551]
558 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1997:
tion,45 the New Jersey test establishes the same rebuttable pre-
sumption found in the Michigan test that RI/FS expenses are
damages.46 Likewise, to rebut the presumption, the PRP must
show that allocating an RI/FS expense to indemnity would re-
lieve the insurer of a cost that it otherwise would have incurred
under its obligation to defend.47 Under the New Jersey test, the
court attempts to be more equitable than legal, thus freeing itself
from the constraint of maneuvering around a bright-line "reason-
able and necessary defense" rule." Unlike the Michigan test,
the court does not define defense costs broadly to include all
expenses that limit damages, but instead makes a "fair alloca-
tion" based on four broad factors: (1) the relative risk that the
PRP would have borne if it had not produced the RI/FS; (2) the
extent to which environmental agencies may have mandated the
details of the RI/FS; (3) the extent to which the RI/FS provided a
means for the insurer or PRP to mitigate potential claims for
damages; and (4) the cost of producing the RI/FS in relation to
the policy limits provided." These factors limit what might oth-
erwise be included in Michigan's broader test of "reasonable and
necessary" for an adequate defense.'
Furthermore, the second factor, which involves the extent to
which expenses were mandatory, also diverges from the Michigan
test, which finds "no logical nexus" between the extent to which
RIIFS expenses "are mandated" and the distinction between de-
fense and indemnification cost.51
The fourth factor, which considers the level of RI/FS expens-
es in relation to the policy limits, is a particularly distinctive
feature of the New Jersey approach. No courts in California,
Michigan, or Minnesota discussed as carefully, if at all, the
parties' rational expectations of defense costs as they relate to
the size of the policy and damages limits. In pursuit of flexibility,
New Jersey's General Accident decision did not create any spe-
cific guidelines relating the size of policy limits to possible limits
on allocations of costs to defense. Instead, the court posed the
rhetorical question of whether "an insurance company that had
"' 672 A2d 1154 (NJ 1996).
16 Id at 1162.
47 Id.
49 Id.
" 672 A2d at 1162.
'0 Id.
" See American Bumper, 550 NW2d at 485.
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issued a policy with limits of $100,000 would expect to undertake
a remedial study that might cost millions of dollars."52
C. The New York Test
The New York test follows the equitable allocation method of
the New Jersey test, but in the interest of clarity and simplicity,
it strictly divides the activities that reduce liability (remedial
investigations) from those that reduce damages (feasibility stud-
ies). The court then exercises broad discretion in allocating or
dividing expenses that cannot otherwise be separated." The
New York test is developed in Endicott Johnson Corp. v Liberty
Mutual Insurance Co. :"
To the extent that an expense is primarily attribut-
able to remedial investigations-which address the
sources and extent of the contamination, whether envi-
ronmental damage can be mitigated by controlling the
sources, or whether additional action is necessary be-
cause of migration of contaminants from the site-the
expense will be treated as a defense cost.
To the extent an expense is primarily attributable
to feasibility studies-which comprise plans for select-
ing and implementing the remediation alternative for
the site-the expense will be treated as damages to be
indemnified.
Finally, to the extent the Court cannot determine
based on written submissions whether an expense is
attributable to either RI or FS, the Court will have
broad discretion to allocate the expense in an equitable
manner.
55
The Endicott Johnson court criticized the New Jersey test for
its legal and scientific complexity, especially in light of the New
Jersey Supreme Court's stated goal of creating a rule with black-
letter simplicity.56 Instead of employing the four factors in the
New Jersey test, the New York test explicitly disregards any
factors other than whether an expense has as its primary pur-
52 672 A2d at 1160.
Endicott Johnson, 928 F Supp at 184.
928 F Supp 176 (N D NY 1996).
Id at 184.
Id at 183.
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pose the goal of remedial investigation or feasibility study.57 For
example, the Endicott Johnson court stated that it would disre-
gard the extent to which the EPA explicitly mandated an RI/FS
expense, contrary to the New Jersey test's second factor."
By bifurcating expenses based on the purposes of remedial
investigations and feasibility studies, the New York test differs
from the Michigan and New Jersey tests by classifying expenses
that attempt to reduce damages as costs of indemnity.
III. THE IDEAL ALLOCATION METHOD SHOULD BE BOTH SIPLE
AND FAIR, UNLIKE THE EXISTING TESTS
On the one hand, not every complex problem has a simple
solution. On the other hand, "fair" solutions that are too complex
can be so expensive and unpredictable that they are fair to no
one. An ideal allocation method consists of the optimal combina-
tion of simplicity and fairness. In General Accident, the New
Jersey Supreme Court most clearly articulated this need:
[We believe that the only fair result is a balanced solu-
tion that takes multiple factors into account .... At the
same time, we do not want to encourage needless litiga-
tion. The advantage of a black-letter rule is simplicity
in administration. We must avoid, at all costs, another
war of experts. ... "
The Michigan, New Jersey, and New York tests each fall
short of the optimal mix of fairness and simplicity. The Michigan
and New York tests do not fully consider the reasonable expecta-
tions of the parties, and the New Jersey and Michigan tests are
too complex. Courts should combine the simplicity of the New
York test and the fairness of the New Jersey test to achieve a
better method of allocation.
A. What the Parties Agree Is Fair Today May Indicate What
Would Have Been Fair in the Past
One of the most fundamental themes in insurance and con-
tract law is that the outcome should fulfill the fair or reasonable
" Id at 184.
928 F Supp at 184 n 2.
" General Accident Insurance Co. v Department of Environmental Protection, 672 A2d
1154, 1162 (NJ 1996).
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expectations of the parties."o Courts in RI/FS cases recognize
that neither insurers nor PRPs could foresee huge CERCLA
claims when they signed the CGL policies at issue.6'
One way for courts to assess the fair expectations of the
parties is to estimate what the parties would have bargained for
if they had known at the time of their agreement what they
know now. Absent any documentation regarding the thoughts of
the parties in the past, courts should find it useful to look at the
terms that current-day parties have reached as a result of bar-
gaining on a relatively level playing field in which both sides
understand the reach of CERCLA and the rise in defense
costs.62
One conclusion that may be drawn from today's environmen-
tal insurance market is that insurers did not expect to pay for
RI/FS expenses that have often exceeded the indemnity limits of
policies. In 1941, the predecessors of the Insurance Services Of-
fice drafted the first industry-wide CGL policy.' Such CGL poli-
cies provided general coverage for accidents and occurrences, but
did not mention environmental cleanup or explicitly limit defense
costs.' After 1966, standard CGL policies partially limited de-
fense costs with a provision stating that the insurer would no
longer be obligated to defend after the policy limits had been
exhausted by the payment of judgments or settlements." In
1970, insurers began to limit pollution claims in standard CGL
coverage, and in 1986, after CERCLA had come into force, CGL
policies began to absolutely exclude all pollution-related
claims."
Today, environmental insurance is a specialized product that
addresses specific kinds of pollution."e The policies either in-
6 Id at 1161.
"1 See, for example, Owens-Illinois, Inc. v United Insurance Co., 650 A2d 974,991 (NJ
1994) ("At least in the case of property damages due to environmental contamination, the
retroactive imposition of absolute liability under laws like CERCLA... was surely un-
known, if not unknowable.").
62 Because most PRPs are businesses, the PRPs and their insurers negotiate on a
relatively level playing field. Contract-of-adhesion principles will rarely apply.
Eugene R. Anderson, History of Disputed Provisions of the 1966 Standard Form
Comprehensive Liability Insurance Policy, Drafting History, Sales History and Historical
Review of Commentators, 269 PLI/Lit 203, 207 (1989).
" Barry R. Ostrager and Thomas R. Newman, Handbook on Insurance Coverage
Disputes §5.03(b) at 135 (Prentice Hall 1994).
Id §5.03(b) at 133.
Comment, The 1970 Pollution Exclusion in Comprehensive General Liability
Policies: Reasons for Interpretations in Favor of Coverage in 1996 and Beyond, 34
Duquesne L R 1083, 1088 (1996).
6 American International Group, Pollution Legal Liability Select (PLL Select), (visit-
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clude defense costs in the policy's limits or cap them separate-
ly.' In states that do not allow caps on defense costs, insurers
charge higher premiums. 9 Insurers also adjust their premiums
to reflect whether their customers want pollution coverage under
existing regulatory standards alone, or under all possible future
regulations.7 °
Today, bargaining between insurers and their business cus-
tomers has resulted in explicit limits on defense costs.71 Eco-
nomically, this result makes sense. To stay in business, insurers
must charge enough in premiums to cover their expected losses.
If the claims for defense costs are unexpectedly large, customers
have to pay significantly higher premiums in the future. Presum-
ably, if enough customers wanted to pay significantly higher pre-
miums to purchase unlimited litigation insurance, some insurers
would sell it. It follows from observing current market offerings,
where the only insurance products generally available have caps
on defense costs, that customers have chosen to accept limits on
defense costs in order to avoid paying a higher premium.72
While PRPs with CGL coverage dating back twenty to thirty
years would not reasonably have expected their insurers to pay
for runaway RI/FS defense costs, they also would not have ex-
pected to pay such expenses themselves. Presumably, they paid
the insurance premiums in order to assign the risk to their insur-
ers.
Furthermore, courts typically resolve insurance contract
clauses with reasonably uncertain meanings in favor of policy-
holders, not insurers. 7' Thus, a policyholder might reasonably
expect an insurance policy that is "comprehensive" and "general"
to pay for absolutely everything. In fact, most courts have found
that costs considered solely as part of a reasonable defense must
be covered by insurers.74 However, this conclusion leads to quite
ed January 15, 1997) <http//access.aig.com/accessaig/about/371619962127021D4.html>
("PLL Select").
Telephone interview with Greg Chamberlain, Engineering Manager, ERIC Under-
writers Agency, Inc., Englewood, Colorado (Dec 20, 1996) ("Chamberlain Interview").
69 Id.
70 Id.
7' Based on insurance programs offered by Commerce & Industry, the primary
environmental insurance member company of American International Group, Inc. ("AIG"),
the leading U.S.-based international insurance organization. American International
Group, PLL Select (cited in note 67).
72 Chamberlain Interview (cited in note 68).
7' See Aerojet, 53 Cal Rptr 2d at 407. The benefit of such a rule is that it forces the
insurer, the party initially writing the contract, to use clear language.
", See American Bumper & Manufacturing Co. v Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 550
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unreasonable results. An insurer should not have to pay millions
of dollars to defend a policyholding PRP with CGL policy limits of'
$100,000. 75
Therefore, to balance the reasonable expectations of both
policyholders and insurers fairly, the ideal solution should follow
the New Jersey test in looking to the policy limits as a factor in
allocating RI/FS expenses between defense and indemnity
costs.76 If a test does not include this factor, it cannot be under-
stood as following the reasonable expectations of the parties,
especially given the ambiguous, dual nature of RI/FS expenses.77
None of the recent cases employing the Michigan or New York
tests even mentions the "policy limits" factor. Though, in New
York's Endicott Johnson decision, which criticizes the New Jersey
test, the absence of a discussion of the policy limits factor is nota-
ble. Only the policy limits factor emerged unscathed from any
criticism.7'
B. Simplicity Leads to More Certainty and More Settlements
The New York test is the most simple and certain of the
three tests. Assuming that having fewer subjective factors in-
creases the predictability of a test, that more predictable results
lead to increased rates of settlement,79 and that settlements are
much quicker and cheaper than trials, a simpler test will in-
crease the number of settlements. By encouraging and facilitat-
ing voluntary settlements, a simpler test thus furthers a funda-
mental goal of CERCLA. °
In establishing the New York test, the Endicott Johnson
court criticized the New Jersey test for failing the New Jersey
court's own goal of establishing a "simple approach."8 ' Endicott
NW2d 475, 485 (Mich 1996); Aerojet-General Corp. v Transport Indemnity Co., 53 Cal Rptr
2d 398, 412 (Cal App 1996). CGL insurers traditionally bear the cost of defense. Hartford
Fire Insurance Co. v California, 509 US 764, 771 (1993).
7' General Accident, 672 A2d at 1161.
76 Id at 1162.
77 See text accompanying note 60 (describing this factor in the New Jersey test).
78 Endicott Johnson Corp. v Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 928 F Supp 176, 183-84 (N
D NY 1996), appeal dismissed, 116 F3d 53 (2d Cir 1997) (criticizing the other three
factors as too "subjective.").
" Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 556 (Little Brown 4th ed 1992). As
the difference between the parties' expectations of who will win narrows, all other things
being the same, the parties will be more likely to settle.
' See Interim Guidance on Notice Letters, Negotiations, and Information Exchange,
EPA Memorandum, 53 Fed Reg 5298 (1988).
61 Endicott Johnson, 928 F Supp at 184.
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Johnson noted that three of the New Jersey test's four factors
were inherently too subjective.82 Given that subjective factors
logically have less predictive value than more objective ones,
following the New Jersey test would lead to less certainty, fewer
settlements, and more time fighting in court.
The Michigan test is also more complex and difficult to ad-
minister than the New York test. The Ex-Cell-O decision, which
became the basis for the Michigan test, acknowledged that the
simplicity of the New York test made the task of allocation easi-
er.' The Ex-Cell-O court, however, decided to make its decision
more difficult by holding that feasibility studies would be consid-
ered defense costs if they would have been part of a "reasonable
and necessary" defense. " The complexity and uncertainty of the
Michigan test is due to the fact that courts must hypothesize how
RI/FS expenses would have been spent in a "reasonable and
necessary" defense. Besides making the inquiry more difficult,
the Michigan test does not reflect the foreseeability factor de-
scribed and applied in the New Jersey test. Thus, the gain in
fairness does not offset the increase in the administrative burden
of decision costs.
C. A Better Method of Allocation Combines the Best Aspects of
the New York and New Jersey Tests
Courts, and if necessary, legislatures, should leave more
resources available for cleaning up the environment by adopting
a test that combines the simplicity of the New York test and an
element of fairness from the New Jersey test. Because courts and
the parties can fairly characterize RI/FS expenses as both a de-
fense and indemnity costs, an intelligent and predictable division
of costs between the PRP and the insurer would make more
sense than an all-or-nothing allocation. The insurer would pay
for remedial-investigation-type expenses as uncapped defense
costs and feasibility-study-type expenses as damages subject to
the policy limits. The court would have broad discretion to divide
any remaining expenses.
82 Id at 183-84. The three factors are: (1) the relative risk the PRP bore if it did not
lead the RI/FS, (2) the extent to which the EPA mandated RI/FS details, and (3) the
extent to which RIFS provide a means for the PRP to mitigate damages.
' Fireman's Fund Insurance Cos. v Ex-Cell-O Corp., 790 F Supp 1318, 1336-37 (E D
Mich 1992).
" Id at 1321.
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This broad discretion would take into account one of the four
factors in the New Jersey test, namely that of the RI/FS expenses
relative to the policy limits. While the broad equity afforded
courts should not be limited by an arbitrary borderline, courts
should scrutinize more closely defense costs that add up to more
than the policy limits. One may reasonably assume that insurers
included the duty to defend in CGL policies in order to protect
their economic interest in limiting or eliminating indemnity
claims. Because no rational insurer would want to pay more to
defend a claim than the claim itself is worth, it is reasonable to
compare the amount of RI/FS expenses with the policy limit.8'
If courts used the combination test, the results of the cases
would not differ wildly from what they are today. The combina-
tion test simply means that the court separates RI from FS ex-
penses and then allocates any remaining amount equitably, keep-
ing in mind the relation between defense cost allocation and the
CGL policy limits. For example, in a case such as American
Bumper, where the PRP ultimately was not liable for cleanup,
the combination test would have allocated RI/FS expenses as
defense costs since the investigations were designed to show that
the level of potentially hazardous material was completely harm-
less."
Even where the PRP accepted liability right away and coop-
erated with the EPA in cleaning up the site, courts following the
combination test would still consider remedial investigations to
be defense costs. This result would conform with the goal of
CERCLA to enable settlements and cooperative behavior. 7 A
PRP would not face the perverse incentive to delay its admission
of liability or its cooperation with the EPA simply to maximize
the allocation of RI/FS expenses to defense costs. This combina-
tion test would contain no excessively complex factors, nor would
it need to show that an investigation was part of a "necessary
and reasonable" defense.
M This statement does not say that a rational insurer would never pay more to
defend a claim than the value of the claim itself. Throughout the litigation process, the
insurer's offer to settle would depend not on the total litigation cost, but on the insurer's
incremental cost of future litigation. The amount already spent on defense would be a
sunk cost and rational insurers would not consider it in deciding future action. Thus, an
insurer would reassess and continue spending money on defense as long as the foresee-
able defense costs were less than the expected amount of the damages award. In this way,
an insurer acting rationally may spend more in defense than the policy limits would
otherwise dictate.
See American Bumper, 550 NW2d at 485.
87 See 53 Fed Reg 5298 (cited in note 80).
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Courts in search of speed should also appreciate the simplici-
ty of a combination test based on the New York approach. A fixed
rule lowers decision costs. Courts would find it much easier to
draw a line between a remedial investigation purpose or a feasi-
bility study purpose of a given expense than to draw a line be-
tween defense costs and damages.
D. Implementation Issues
While the line between remedial investigations and feasibili-
ty studies may seem clear in theory and in reports to the EPA,
insurers or PRPs cooperating with their environmental engineer-
ing contractors may find ways to shift expenses unilaterally from
one category to another." Such expense shifting, if pervasive
enough, would upset the balance between the parties' reasonable
expectations that the combination test achieves. For example, ac-
cording to one leading environmental engineer, such shifting
between RI and FS categories can occur in the data collection
process.89 If an environmental engineer's client wanted to load
costs into the RI, where the client's insurer pays for them as
defense costs, the engineers would meticulously collect all con-
ceivably useful data during the RI.9° On the other hand, if the
insurers were influencing the actions of the environmental engi-
neers, the engineers probably would engage in a somewhat curso-
ry RI. Later, in the FS stage, when they calculated and chose the
least costly remedy, they might find an "unexpectedly" large
number of "data gaps" that would require the expense of further
data collection.91
Most of the data collection and field testing expenses are
attributable to the purposes of the RI. Most FSs include some
data collection expenses, but FSs primarily involve analyzing
data already collected to determine the most cost-effective reme-
dy. Although during the FS, environmental engineers inevitably
must fine-tune or retest some data collected during the RI, the
bulk of data collection expenses should occur during the RI. Even
though each case is unique, judges should ask for specific expla-
nations of large data collection expenses occurring during the FS
Telephone interview with Val Britton, Engineer, Science Management Consult-
ing-Environmental Services Group, GeoSciences Division, (Jan 8, 1997). Mr. Britton has
fifteen years of environmental engineering experience.
9 Id.
9o Id.
91 Id.
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stage, especially if the insurer chose the environmental engineer-
ing firm.
The combination test faces two other implementation risks.
First, the judge's discretion to allocate expenses that do not clear-
ly fall on one side or the other will be too broad. Even subject to
a policy limits factor, broad discretion may prevent the combina-
tion test from attaining the predictability to which it aspires.
Second, the "basic explanation"92 requested of each party by the
judge will become more than just basic. Given the large dollars
involved, and especially if the combination test does not perform
predictably in practice, each party may be inclined to hire mutu-
ally contradictory experts to "help" the judge understand each
party's breakdown of its RI/FS expenses.
Judges, insurers, and PRPs employing the combination test,
however, are in a better position than their counterparts who
struggle under other tests because it is easier to determine
whether an expense is more closely attributable to an RI or to an
FS than it is to distinguish between a defense cost and an indem-
nity cost. Not only do the purposes of the RI and FS diverge, but
they often occur sequentially, and thus may be separated also by
time.93 Finally, because the categories are easier to distinguish,
the combination test can rely on the expertise of the parties
themselves to watch for any potential expense shifting between
the categories.
CONCLUSION
Combining the New York test and the policy limit factor of
the New Jersey test is a better solution for allocating RI/FS ex-
penses between indemnity and defense. It combines both fairness
and administrative simplicity. In doing so, it gives insurers confi-
dence that the reasonable expectations of the parties will be
enforced. This, in turn, lowers the uncertainty involved with
judicial interpretation in the future and consequently lowers
price of premiums that insurers would otherwise charge to ac-
count for such uncertainty.94 By allowing more certainty in the
outcome, the combination test also leads to more settlements and
92 Endicott Johnson, 928 F Supp at 184 n 3.
See 40 CFR § 300.430 (1994). Because the FS usually uses data collected during
the RI, the bulk of FS activity occurs after the RI.
9 Future premiums would be kept lower to the extent that they would not have to
take into account a disproportionate and unreasonable allocation by the courts of any
future unexpected costs.
551] 567
568 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1997:
less strain on the already overburdened courts. Finally, it reduc-
es the amount of money spent on the allocation fight, possibly
freeing up resources for greater environmental cleanup.
Given the great number of environmental contamination
sites, any increased speed in the process helps ease the burden of
the resulting litigation.
